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Boal: Workmen's Compensation Law - Fixing Liability in Occupational Dis
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW-Fixing Liability in Occupational Disease
Cases. Olson v. Federal American Partners, 567 P.2d 710 (Wyo. 1977).

Ralph Olson was an underground uranium miner for thirteen years and had been employed as follows: January 3, 1958
to February 27, 1970-Continental Uranium Co.; March 4,
1970 to January 15,, 1971-Federal American Partners; October 11, 1970 to January 15, 1971-Continental Uranium
Co.; January 18, 1971 to December 29, 1971-Federal American Partners. During the last period of employment with
Federal American Partners, Olson became ill and died on May
23, 1973 of small cell undifferentiated lung cancer. His widow
filed a claim seeking benefits under the Wyoming Occupational Disease Law' contending that her husband's lung cancer was induced by radiation exposure arising out of his employment. The claim was filed against Federal American Partners, allegedly because it was the last employer to injuriously
expose Olson to radiation, though he had worked only eighteen months for the company. 2 The employer denied liability,
claiming Olson had not been subjected to injurious radiation
exposure during the time he was employed by the company
and, therefore, his employment with Federal American Partnbrs was not the cause of the lung cancer. Lastly, the employer contended there was no certainty the cancer was caused
by uranium mining since the deceased was a habitual cigarette
smoker, having smoked daily at least a pack to a pack and a
half from 1949 to 1971. Both the lower court and the Wyoming Supreme Court refused to award compensation to the
claimant. The court concluded that although the cancer may
have been caused by uranium mining, there was not sufficient
evidence to prove that Olson was last injuriously exposed by
3
this particular employer.
As noted above, the court applied the provisions of the
4
Wyoming Occupational Disease Law in deciding this case.
This law has since been repealed and future occupational disease disputes will be resolved by a revised Workmen's Compensation Act.5 Unlike 'the Occupational Disease Law, the
current Workmen's Compensation Act does not contain a
Copyright C 1978 by the University of Wyoming.

1. WYO. STAT. §§ 27-288 to 27-309 (Cum. Supp. 1973) (repealed 1975).
2. WYO. STAT. § 27-293 (Cum. Supp. 1973) (repealed 1975). The employer's account
in whose employment the employee was last injuriously exposed is solely liable for
any compensation.
3. Olson v. Federal American Partners, 567 P. 2d 710,713 (Wyo. 1977).
4. WYO. STAT. §§ 27-288 to 27-309 (Cum. Supp. 1973) (repealed 1975).
5. WYO. STAT. §§ 27-12-101 to 27-12-804 (1977).
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provision which is comparable to Section 27-293. In a typical
disease case, this provision came into play only after the employee had established he had suffered a compensatory industrial disease. 6 Often the ailment had developed gradually
over a number of years and more than one employer had contributed to its debilitating effect. The purpose of the provision
was then to attach liability to the employer who was the last
to injuriously expose the employee to the hazardous substance .7
Because there is no replacement for Section 27-293 in the
present law, this Note will address three questions: First, is
there a need under the current law for the court to adopt a
test or method for fixing liability in a case involving occupational disease? Secondly, if such a test is desirable, what are
the alternatives from which the court might choose? And finally, should an employer have an action of contribution
against previous employers who have contributed to the disease? 8
AWARDING COMPENSATION
It is not surprising to find that compensation for occupational disease has lagged far behind other types of industrial
coverage in the United States. 9 One reason may be because it
is difficult to show that a disease is causally connected to a
particular period of employment. 10 Olson's situation provides
a good example. Determining the actual time when lung cancer first begins in a human is medically impossible." Doctors
are limited to looking at a period of exposure to a carcinogenic
substance and can only conclude that the cancer was induced
sometime during that exposure. The length of time necessary
for the development of the cancer varies from four to twenty
years depending upon several factors, including the concen6. See WYO. STAT. § 27-293 (Cum. Supp. 1973) (repealed 1975). This provision requires the employee to have, "suffered a compensable occupational disease covered
by this act," before it will employ the last injurious exposure test to fix liability on
an employer.
7. 4 LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 95.12 at 17-71 (1978) [hereinafter cited as 4 LARSON].
8. WYO. STAT. § 27-293 (Cum. Supp. 1973) (repealed 1975). This Section specifically
denied an employer any right of contribution against previous employers who
might have contributed to the occupational disease.
9. 4 LARSON, supra note 7, § 41.20, at 7-258 to 7-260.
10. Id. at 7-258 to 7-260.
11. Transcript of Trial Proceedings, Vol. 1 at 83, Olson v. Federal American Partners,
supra note 3.
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tration level of the exposure and the existence of other promoting agents. Once the cancer has taken hold, further exposure to a hazardous substance, like radiation, may accelerate
or promote the development of the disease." Consequently,
a miner who works in several uranium mines over the years
may contract lung cancer and not be able to identify the period of employment that caused the disease. Yet, it is likely
that each employer contributed to the malady.
In response to this problem, an occupational disease law
will often contain a specialized provision designed solely to
fix liability. 13 Section 27-293 of the repealed Wyoming Occupational Disease Law14 was an example of these specialized
provisions in that it attached liability to the employer who
was the last to injuriously expose the employee to the harmful substance.
Surely, the court will have to adopt a similar test when
fixing liability in future occupational disease cases unless the
current Workmen's Compensation Act contains language that
would resolve the question if it arose. One possibility lies in
the burden of proof provision which requires the claimant to
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the disease
arose out of and in the course of the worker's employment. 15
A court's interpretation of the word "employment," as
used in Section 27-12-603, is critical to a claimant seeking
benefits because of an occupational disease.16 One obvious definition is that the word refers to the relationship of a particular
employer to an employee. The use of the term in this way
would cause few problems, if any, in most industrial accident
12.
13.
14.
15.

16.

Id. at 40-41.
4 LARSON, supra note 7, § 95.21, at 17-86 to 17-87.
WYO. STAT. § 27-293 (Cum. Supp. 1973) (repealed 1975).
WYO. STAT. § 27-12-103 (1977). In order to discharge this burden the claimant
must show:
(i)
There is a direct causal connection between the condition or circumstances
under which the work is performed and the injury;
(ii) The injury can be seen to have followed as a natural incident of the work as a
result of the employment;
(iii) The injury can fairly be traced to the employment as a proximate cause;
(iv) The injury does not come from a hazard to which employees would have been
equally exposed outside of the employment; and
(v) The injury is incidental to the character of the business and not independent
of the relation of employer and employee.
See generally 4 LARSON, supra note 7, § 41.32 at 7-264 to 7-265. Factors, such as
those found in the Wyoming Statute, are designed to create a general test of causation.
See WYo. STAT. § 27-12-102 (1977). The Act fails to provide a definition of the
word employment.
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cases. 7 However, such an interpretation has a disastrous effect on a claimant who, because of the peculiar nature of the
disease, is unable to pinpoint which period of employment
caused the injury. A claimant, such as Olson's widow, is imposed with an extremely difficult burden of proving it was
the eighteen months of employment with Federal American
Partners that caused the lung cancer. If she could make such
a showing, there would be no need for the court to invoke a
test for the purpose of fixing liability. Obviously, the employer who caused the injury would be held accountable for
the total amount of compensation.
On the other hand, the court could use the term in a generic fashion, i.e., as referring to a type or class of employment such as uranium mining. Adoption of this interpretation
would cause few problems in the usual case of an industrial accident, and it would ease the burden of a worker suffering
from an occupational disease immensely. The claimant would
only be required to show that her husband's lung cancer had a
direct causal connection to uranium mining and not that it was
caused specifically by the eighteen months of employment
with Federal American Partners.
This view is not without the endorsement of several jurisdictions.' 8 Perhaps the best example is Virginia which has a
workmen's compensation law containing a provision very
similar to the one found in the Wyoming Act. 19 In fact, there
is a possibility that the Virginia Statute was used by Wyoming
in formulating its law. 20 In examining the burden of proof
provision, the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia agreed
with the majority opinion of the Industrial Commission of
Virginia that the word "employment", as used in the statute,
does not describe the relationship between employer and employee. Rather, the word refers to the nature of the work in
which an employee has been engaged. 2' A New York court
further explained when it pointed out that an occupational
disease is one which results from the nature of the employTranscript of Trial Proceedings, Vol. II at 215, Olson v. Federal.American Partners,
supra note 3. It appears the district court chose to use the term in this manner.
E.g., Elm Springs Canning Co. v. Sullins, 207 Ark. 257, 180 S.W.2d 113, 115
(1944); Anderson v. Roberts-Karp Hotel, 171 Minn. 402, 204 N.W. 265 (1927).
19. VA. CODE § 65.1-46 (1973).
20. Olson v. Federal American Partners, supra note 3, at 715. The dissenting opinion
suggests that Wyoming took its burden of proof language from the statutes of either
Virginia, Illinois or Indiana.
21. Pocahontas Fuel Co. v. Godbey, 192 Va. 845, 66 S.E.2d 859, 863-64 (1951).
17.

18.
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ment, and by "nature", the court is alluding to conditions
common to employees of a class.2 2 However, jurisdictions
adopting this interpretation must also devise a means of attaching liability in cases where more than one employer has
contributed to the disease.
This approach has a certain amount of appeal in disputes
involving workmen's compensation. The philosophy behind
such coverage is that one need show only that the injury is
work-related in order to receive benefits in their most dignified, efficient and certain form.u The test of liability depends
on a proven connection between work and injury, and that
is all. 24 There is no requirement that the injury also be connected with a particular employer.
In Olson, the court applied a burden of proof provision
which is almost identical to the one found in the present
Workmen's Compensation Law.2 5 Nevertheless, the court was
able to avoid articulating its interpretation of the word "employment". Instead, it appears to have disposed of the case
by focusing on the "last injurious exposure" requirement of
Section 27-293.26 It should be noted, however, that the mining company argued the term "employment" should be used
to refer specifically to the eighteen months Olson worked for
Federal American Partners and indeed, it seems the district
court used the term in this manner.2 7 The question will certainly arise again, and because there is no comparable provision to Section 27-293, the court will eventually have to define this term.
FIXING LIABILITY
It is possible, if not likely, that the court will interpret
the burden of proof provision so it will require the claimant
to demonstrate only that the disease is causally linked to the
employee's occupation. In this event, the court would also
22.
23.

Harman v. Republic Aviation Corp., 298 N.Y. 285, 82 N.E.2d 785, 786 (1948).
1 LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 2.20, at 5 (1978).

24. Id.
25.

26.
27.

WYO. STAT. § 27-12-102 (1977). The current Workmen's Compensation Act incorporated the burden of proof provisioncof the repealed Occupational Disease
Law. However, the new provision substitutes the word "injury" for the word "disease". The act goes on to define injury as any harmful change in a human organism
other than normal aging. WYO. STAT. § 27-311(n) (Interim Supp. 1977).
Olson v. Federal American Partners, supra note 3, at 713.
Transcript of Trial Proceedings, Vol. II at 215, Olson v. Federal American Partners,
supra note 3.
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have to develop a method whereby it could attach liability
where successive employers have each contributed to the ailment. It should be emphasized that at this point, the claimant
will have already established that he has suffered a compensatory occupational disease. 8 The only question remaining is
whether this particular employer should be held liable.
Since it is settled that the claimant is entitled to benefits,
any test developed for the purpose of fixing liability ought to
be designed to assure compensation. For instance, the test
should require a showing that is readily susceptible to a positive demonstration. Above all, it should add a degree of definiteness and predictability to the law, so the claimant does
not have'to guess as to which employer he should sue.
Last injuriousExposure Rule
Unfortunately, the last injurious exposure rule, as set
forth in Section 27-293 of the repealed Occupational Disease
Law, fails to reflect either of these characteristics. This rule
places full liability on the employer who is the last to injuriously expose the worker. 29 An injurious exposure is said to
have occurred, when the exposure causes the malady or at
30
least aggravates, promotes or accelerates the disease.
A claimant, such as Olson's widow, undertakes the extremely difficult task of proving the radiation from the employer's mine contributed in some identifiable fashion to the
development of the cancer. As mentioned above, it is not
medically feasible to demonstrate the specific effect of particular units of radiation. As a result, the claimant is required
to prove an element which is presently not susceptible to
proof.3 The sad result is that, even though it is certainly conceivable that Olson died of an occupational disease, his widow
is denied benefits simply because the method of fixing liability
is difficult, if not impossible, to satisfy.
Furthermore, this rule does not make clear which employer the claimant should sue. Perhaps, Olson's widow would have
28.
29.
30.
31.

WYO. STAT. § 27-293 (Cum. Supp. 1973) (repealed 1975). This provision specifically stated that it came into play only, "[w]hen an employee has suffered a compensable occupational disease covered by this act."
4 LARSON, supra note 7, § 95.12, at 17-71.
Pocahontas Fuel Co. v. Godbey, supra note 21, at 864.
Transcript of Trial Proceedings, Vol. I at 83, Olson v. Federal American Partners,
supra note 3.
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been successful if she had filed an action against the first employer, but a suit of this type involves an additional risk. 32 The
claimant not only must satisfy the injurious exposure requirement, but also must prove the last injurious exposure occurred
during that period of employment.n Again, this point cannot
be conclusively established by medical evidence. 34 Therefore,
it is possible for a claimant in Olson's position to sue each
employer separately, establishing in each case that he has suffered an occupational disease, and be denied compensation in
each case because of the last injurious exposure rule.
One might avoid this predicament by filing a single cause
of action joining all employers as defendants.3 In this situation, if a court found that an employee's disease was a result
of his occupation, it would have all the accountable parties
present and would have heard the evidence in total. Conceivably at this point, the court is in the proper position to make
a fair determination as to who committed the last injurious
exposure, and a claimant would not come away without compensation.3 Unfortunately, due to jurisdiction and venue
considerations, it is not always possible to join all the former
employers. 37 In this event, the claimant would have no alternative but to deal with the perplexing requirements of the
last injurious exposure rule.
Time of Disability Test
There is a second method of fixing liability which could
be used by the Wyoming courts in occupational disease cases.
The majority of jurisdictions assign liability to the party who
is the employer at the time the disease results in disability if
32.
33.
34.
35.

36.
37.

Transcript of Trial Proceedings, Vol. II at 213. Olson v. Federal American Partners,
supra note 3. The district court doubted that the claimant could have satisfied the
rigors of the injurious exposure rule even if she had sued Olson's first employer.
4 LARSON, supra note 7, at 17-71.
Transcript of the Proceedings, Vol. 1 at 83, Olson v. Federal American Partners,
supra note 3.
WYo. R. CIV. P. 20(a). All persons may be joined in one action as defendants if
there is asserted against them jointly, severally, or in the alternative, any right to
relief in respect of or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of
transactions or occurrences and if any question of law or fact common to all of
them will arise in the action.
WYo. R. CIV. P. 20(a). The rule provides that a judgment may be given to the
plaintiff against one or more of the defendants according to their respective liabilities.
See generally WYO. STAT, § 5-1-107 (1977). For instance, if an employee had
worked for a mining company outside the state and this company had engaged in
little or no mining activity in Wyoming, then it is unlikely that a state court could
acquire personal jurisdiction over this employer. See also WYO. STAT. § 1-5-105
(1977). According to this provision it is feasible that two domestic corporations
could not be joined because a court would lack proper venue.
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the employment was of the type that could contribute to the
disease.3 This method is notably simple and easy to apply in
comparison with the last injurious exposure rule."9
First, it requires a showing which can be readily demonstrated. The claimant need only establish the date of disability
and that the employment at the time was of the type that
could contribute to the disease.40 For instance, the claimant
in Olson, would have had little trouble in demonstrating the
date her husband became ill and had to cease work. Nor
would there have been much difficulty in establishing that his
employment at the time was of the type that might contribute
to.the cancer.
Unquestionably, the standard of proof imposed by the
time of disability test is much easier for the claimant to establish, and perhaps, this is one reason why it should be preferred over the last injurious exposure rule. Workmen's compensation laws are designed to protect persons who have suffered casuality from industry, and their provisions should be
construed accordingly. 4 ' Certainly, at the stage of fixing liability, the court should require showings of proof which
claimants can regularly provide.
In addition, this test has the cardinal merit of being definite. 42 It identifies an instant at which a court can establish
43
a claimant's right to benefits and fix the employer's liability.
A claimant in Olson's position does not have to speculate as
to which employer he should sue. The time of disability test
provides sufficient guidance in order that he may make the
44
decision with reasonable certainty.
In essence, this test permits the court to focus on the primary issue of an occupational disease case: is the ailment
casually connected to the worker's occupation? If a claimant
38. 4 LARSON, supra note 7, § 95.21, at 17-79 to 17-80.
39. Id. at § 95.22 gives an explanation as to how the time of disability test is applied in
a case where disability occurs after termination of employment. Id. at § 95.23 examines how the test might work where an employee suffers a compensable disease
without disablement.
40. Mathis v. State Accident Ins. Fund, 10 Ore. App. 139, 499 P.2d 1331, 1336
(1972).
41. Wright v. Wyoming State Training School, 71 Wyo. 173, 255 P.2d 211, 217 (1953).
42. 4 LARSON, supra note 7, § 95.21 at 17-85.
43. Id. at 17-83 to 17-85.
44. Id. at 17-85 to 17-86.
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can satisfy this requirement, he is reasonably assured that
compensation will not be denied simply because the law employs a problematical method of fixing liability.
CONTRIBUTION

Once the requirements of either test have been met, full
liability is imposed on the appropriate employer without considering his actual contribution to the disease.4 5 The employer is held accountable for the total award even though the
worker may have been employed by him for only a brief period. 46 Several states attempt to limit the unequal distribution
of liability by providing the employer with a right of contribution against previous employers who have contributed to the
ailment. 47 This contribution reduces the hardship imposed on
an employer who may have benefited from the employee's
services for only a short length of time. 48
In contrast an action for contribution is actually undesirable under the workmen's compensation schemes of some
states. 49 For instance, Virginia's workmen's compensation statute creates a general fund to which each employer pays premiums in order that the cost of industrial accidents may be distributed among them.50 When a worker suffers a compensatory
injury, the appropriate employer files a report, and the award
is paid from the general fund." An action of contribution in
this circumstance is largely without merit because it would simply redistribute an already distributed cost. Certainly, an overworked judicial system should not have to tolerate additional
actions of this sort. Therefore, states such as Virginia statutorily deny an employer any right of contribution against
52
previous employers.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

51.
52.

See generally 4 LARSON, supra note 7, § 95.21.
Id. at 17-87.
E.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 417.9 (1967); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 176.66(5) (1966);
N.Y. WORK. COMP. LAW § 44 (McKinney 1965).
Climax Uranium Co. v. Smith, 33 Colo. App. 337, 522 P.2d 134 (1974). In this
case the employer was charged with full liability even though the claimant had
been employed only 20 days.
E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48, § 172.36(d) (Smith-Hurd Cum. Supp. 1977); VA.
CODE § 65-14.6 (1973). Each of these states has denied by statute the employer an
action of contribution against other employers in occupational disease cases.
VA. CODE § 65.1-104 (Cum. Supp. 1977). Under the Virginia Law the employer
also has the option to insure his liability with a private carrier or simply provide
proof of financial ability to pay workmen's compensation.

VA. CODE § 65.1-93 (1973).
VA. CODE § 65.1-50 (1973).
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In Wyoming, the workmen's compensation scheme operates in much the same manner. Each employer pays premiums which are placed in three central accounts, the main
one being the general account. 53 But unlike Virginia, the
Wyoming system also maintains a separate account of the
payments made by each employer.Y Any award for the death
or injury of a worker is charged against the specific account
of the appropriate employer. 55 If an employer has numerous
claims charged against his account, it may become overdrawn.
When this happens, the employer is required to make increased
payments until the overdraft is cleared.5 6
Under the Wyoming compensation scheme, an employer
can save a significant amount of money if he can avoid having
large awards charged against his account. Thus, where a worker receives a substantial award, it is in the employer's best interest to be able to apportion the burden of compensation
among the accounts of other employers. However, the repealed
Occupational Disease Law specifically denied an employer
any right of contribution against previous employers.5 7 Consequently, if the claimant in Olson had been awarded compensation, the account of Federal American Partners would
have been charged the full amount without right of contribution, even though the company received the benefit of Olson's
services for only eighteen months. Perhaps the Wyoming
Court considered this disparity when deciding against compensation.
At any rate, the present Workmen's Compensation Act is
silent on the subject of contribution. The Act neither condones nor prohibits contribution among employers who have
contributed to the disease.5 8 In the future, it would appear
the Court has the option of adopting a right of contribution
in industrial disease cases.59 The adoption of this right would
significantly diminish the hardship imposed on an employer
53. WYO. STAT. § 27-12-701 (1977).
54. WYO. STAT. §§ 27-12-701, 21-12-704 (1977).
55. WYO. STAT. § 27-12-704 (1977); see also WYO. STAT. § 27-70 (Supp. 1973) (repealed 1975). This provision explains that the purpose of keeping separate accounts is to encourage care on the employer's part, and thus decrease the rate of industrial injury. It almost connotes a tort concept.
56. WYo. STAT. § 27-12-203 (1977).
57. WYO. STAT. § 27-293 (Supp. 1973) (repealed 1975).
58. WYO. STAT. § 27-12-101 to 27-12-804 (1977).
59. See 4 LARSON, supra note 7, § 95.32, 7-111 to 7-112.
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who is held liable. It follows, that by distributing the employers burden through contribution, the court might also increase
the likelihood that the claimant will recover in the first place.
CONCLUSION

The State of Wyoming is destined to become one of the
leading producers of uranium ore in the United States. 6 1 As a
consequence the courts will, with increasing frequency, be
dealing with miners who contend they have contracted lung
cancer because of their occupation. Many, if not most of
these miners, will have worked for several mining companies.
As new mines open and older mines close, Wyoming miners
will remain in the industry regardless of the name of the company .61
By virtue of the relatively recent Workmen's Compensation Act, the Wyoming Court has the opportunity to consider
what possible methods exist for fixing liability in cases of occupational disease like lung cancer. It may also consider the
question of whether a right to contribution should exist. The
Court should strive to resolve these issues in a manner that
will afford employees with maximum protection and at the
same time avoid imposing an unfair burden of compensation
on employers.
DENNIS M. BOAL

60.
61.

Casper Star Tribune, June 15, 1977, at 12-14.
Supplemental and Amendatory Brief of Appellant, Olson v. Federal American Partners, supra note 3.
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